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Holding the High Ground: The Operational Calculus
of Torture and Coercive Interrogation
JOSEPH L. FALvEY, JR.*
BRIAN D. ECK**
He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a
monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will gaze also into
thee.1
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers an apparent inconsistency in some recent
objections to torture that have been raised in the context of national
security concerns. These objections often depend on the notion that
torture's object is precisely not just to damage but to destroy a human
being's power to decide for himself what his loyalty and convictions
permit him to do[;] . .. to reduce its victim to a screaming animal for
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whom decision is no longer possible-the most profound insult to his
humanity, the most profound outrage of his human rights.2
This objection, however, is inadequate because it does not clearly
account for the fundamental purpose of interrogation, and therefore
for modern torture. Modern torture is not undertaken to punish a
wrongdoer or to give pleasure to a sadist or tyrant, but rather to com-
pel the subject to reveal secrets of tactical value. This compulsion
depends on a simple calculus: the will to resist must be less than the
pressure to reveal.4 The former is sapped and the latter increased by
breaking the subject's bonds with the outside world ("regression"),
totally isolating the subject within himself-a condition that is utterly
abhorrent to human nature5-and then re-establishing the subject's
connection with the world in such a way that compliance becomes
palatable ("rationalization"). 6 Thus, as the Central Intelligence
Agency's interrogation manual notes, maiming and bludgeoning a sub-
ject is often counterproductive to the long-term goal of reforming the
subject's will. 7
Our point of departure from the above objection is this: the most
profound insult to someone's humanity is not to make him a scream-
ing animal (i.e., to render him incapable of decision); instead, it is the
successful attempt to compel his will so that he believes what it is expe-
dient that he believe. Likewise, the evil most difficult to uproot is not
that of taking pleasure in the abjection of another, but the belief that
such abjection is necessary for the common good. Accordingly, mod-
ern torture could become worse than blowtorches and bamboo cages
used for terror or orthodoxy or even pleasure. Since modern torture is
simply a tool to bring about a certain result-i.e., a re-education that
could be characterized as a more subtle and lasting form of slavery-
the objection noted above is inadequate insofar as it is merely a gut
response to the brutality of the methods involved. And inadequate
objections may lead to permissible scenarios and unfounded
justifications.
2. RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLIn-
CAL DEBATE 38-39 (2006).
3. See EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 114-16 (2d ed. 1996).
4. CIA, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 82 (1963), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/01-O l.htm.
5. See generally Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325 (2006) (noting the harmful psychological effects of solitary
confinement in prisons and in isolated situations such as Arctic facilities).
6. CIA, supra note 4, at 82-85.
7. Id. at 64.
[Vol. 32:561
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Torture is obviously a timely subject and it has attracted the atten-
tion of many able scholars who have investigated and chronicled the
issues surrounding its use in the War on Terror.8 Although some
recent commentators appear to pass over the deeper considerations
about modern torture, others identify more substantial objections by
considering torture's effects on human dignity. 9 These objections to
torture, however, are only partially adequate and fail to appreciate the
effect the permissive use of torture has on the esprit de corps of our
soldiers and the moral certitude of our country. The analysis offered
by the Judge Advocates General of the U.S. armed forces in response to
the Office of Legal Counsel's 2003 Working Group Report 1° points
toward a more adequate objection to torture by (among other things)
considering these effects."
In Part I of this Article, we first consider some of the strengths and
weaknesses of the partially adequate objections. In Part II, we explore
torture in light of the biological distinction between pain and suffering
and consider the implications of that distinction for our understand-
ing of free will and the fighting spirit. Finally, in Part III, we suggest a
more fundamental view of torture that navigates between the Scylla of
naive moralizing and the Charybdis of ticking time-bombs. We pro-
pose that the debate should focus on torture's effect on our country's
moral certainty, on the fighting spirit of our armed forces, and on our
overall strategy in combating asymmetric foes and jihadist extremism.
This notion of torture will cast an important part of the discussion in
sharper relief while providing a clearer norm for those who make and
execute policy to defend our nation from terrorism.
I. INADEQUATE OBJECTIONS TO TORTURE
The treatment of detainees at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan,
Abu Ghraib prison and Camp Bucca in Iraq, and many secret "black
sites" across the world has sparked a heated debate about torture and
8. See, e.g., TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sandford Levinson ed., 2004).
9. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Torture's Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881 (2005).
10. WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS (2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
03.04.04.pdf.
11. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2005/07/jag-memos-on-military-interrogation.html (July 27, 2005, 08:08 EST) (pro-
viding the text of the various JAG memoranda).
2010] 563
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coercive interrogation. 12 Although several others have meticulously
chronicled recent events, 13 renowned historian Edward Peters wrote a
thorough and insightful analysis of torture, tracing the phenomenon
from Ancient Greece to Rome, from medieval Europe to modern
nation-states.14 Peters noted that after the moral reforms that over-
turned the darker practices of the ancien regime, the word torture grad-
ually lost its meaning to sentimentality.' 5 Professor David Luban
came to a similar conclusion years later, noting that "for the first time
[we may] find it possible to view torture from the torturer's point of
view rather than the victim's."' 6 Thus, it would be both theoretically
and historically absurd to claim that torture has passed from the
world. For the Third Reich, the moral sentiment of the race (Volksges-
wissen) was a sufficient guide and justification for whatever means
became necessary; communist Russian revolutionaries relied on the
dictatorship of the proletariat to justify torture; and the French
resorted to torture due to the exceptional circumstances presented by
the conflict in Algiers.' 7 Likewise, torture seems far more historically
12. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/1 1/01/AR2005110101644.html.
13. E.g., KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB
(2005).
14. See PETERS, supra note 3.
15. See id. at 148-51 (explaining that "[tjhe nineteenth-century language of moral-
ity and sentiment, expanded and applied to increasing kinds and numbers of human
relationships, widened the applicability of the term to all areas of human brutality,
from the workplace to the home," thus gutting the legal definition of "torture" and
substituting for it a "vague idea of moral sentiment"); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Why Is Torture
"Different" and How Different Is It?, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1411, 1433 (2009) (outlining
a thought experiment in which "torture" simply means inflicting severe pain).
16. DavidJ. Luban, Liberalism and the Unpleasant Question of Torture, 91 VA. L. REv.
1425, 1439 (2005). Luban suspects that, historically speaking, intelligence gathering
has been
the least common motivation for torture, and thus the one most readily over-
looked. And yet it alone bears no essential connection with tyranny. This is
not to say that the torture victim experiences it as any less terrifying, humili-
ating, or tyrannical. The victim, after all, undergoes abject domination by the
torturer. But it will dawn on reluctant liberals that the torturer's goal of fore-
stalling greater evils is one that liberals share. It seems like a rational motiva-
tion, far removed from cruelty and power-lust.
Id. at 1439.
17. See generally PETERS, supra note 3, at 105-40. Peters goes on to provide the
following historical commentary:
Blackstone's observation that in England torture was the engine of the state,
not of law, was indeed true as far as it went. But the revolutionary state of the
twentieth century was something that Blackstone could not have imagined.
564
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consistent with America's ethics and national character than our con-
demnations would otherwise suggest. Starting with the beginning of
the twentieth century, Professor John Parry chronicles allegations of
torture by the United States in the Philippines,18 at the start of the
Cold War,19 in Vietnam,20 in Latin America,21 and within the domestic
police forces and prisons.22 He also traces the reservations and limita-
tions of the various laws against torture and concludes that "the appro-
priate descriptive narrative for torture and abuse in the war on terror is
less one of disjuncture and more one of continuity with the rule of law
as a domestic practice. 23
Infinitely more wealthy and powerful, moved by ideologies that excited more
and more of its citizens, possessed of organs of intelligence that could dis-
pense with traditional divisions of authority, the coercive revolutionary state
of the twentieth century could introduce torture into any or all of its proce-
dures, for it had developed not only new powers, but a new anthropology. In
place of the rights of man and citizen, there was substituted the exclusive
right of the Volk or the Revolution. Against these, the fragile barriers in
which the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers and jurists had
misplaced so much faith began to crumble more quickly than they had ever
dreamed possible.
Everyone understood perfectly by 1957 how torture had come to be
used in the Third Reich, and even (Krushchev had delivered his speech to the
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956) in the USSR during the Revolution and
the period of Stalin's solidification of his own rule. But that French officials
should practice torture upon Algerians and French citizens, that it was not
merely the military, but the police who used it .... The publicity attendant
upon the revelations of 1957 and after brought the question of torture out of
the arm's-length land of despised and sub-human enemies into the streets of
Paris and the prisons of Algiers. Even the democratic West was no longer
immune from what Sartre called the plague of the twentieth century.
Id. at 130-31, 134.
18. John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. LJ. 1001, 1005-08 (2009).
19. Id. at 1008-11.
20. Id. at 1011-14
21. Id. at 1014-16.
22. Id. at 1016-28.
23. Id. at 1056. Specifically, Parry noted that
[blefore September 11, ideas of the rule of law, legitimate government con-
duct, and sovereign power-not to mention notions of decency-had already
evolved to make room for the kinds of practices that are routine in police
work and in maximum security and supermax prisons. That is to say, the
facilities, rules, and practices that exploded into public view at Abu Ghraib
and Guantdnamo are not so very different from those that have operated and
continue to operate on a much larger scale within the United States.
2010] 565
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Nevertheless, on the surface, our nation's legal standards on tor-
ture reflect a clear and strident rejection of it in all forms. 24 In signing
the Convention Against Torture, the United States agreed that "no
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."25 But the United
States ratified it subject to certain limitations on what constitutes tor-
ture.26 As Professor Parry noted, these and other limitations were
designed to permit as much coercive conduct as possible, as they
24. Professor Huhn has explained this view:
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, which the Senate unanimously ratified in 1955, prohibits
the parties to the treaty from acts upon prisoners including "violence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; . . . outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment." Second, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, which the Senate ratified in 1992, states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Third, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, which the Senate ratified in 1994,
provides that "[elach State Party shall take effective legislative, administra-
tive, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction," and that "[elach State Party shall undertake to prevent
in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture .... "
Wilson R. Huhn, Waterboarding Is Illegal, WASH. U. L. REv. COMMENTARIES (May 10,
2008), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/waterboarding-is-illegal (footnotes
omitted) (alterations in original).
25. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
26. In order for an act to constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture,
the act
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suf-
fering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened inflic-
tion of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or applica-
tion, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the person-
ality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person
will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind altering substances or other proce-
dures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st
Cong. 58 at 10 (1990) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State) (emphasis added). The United States further instituted its obligations by pass-
ing the War Crimes Act, a "Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
6
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construct a sharp dichotomy between horrific acts that amount to tor-
ture and other forms of conduct. Torture would become a category
with few gray areas, because it would encompass only the worst of the
worst-conduct that everyone assumed was not only already illegal but
also almost never practiced in the United States. In the process, more
debatable categories of conduct would be shunted aside and appar-
ently relegated en masse to the lesser category of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. At the same time, [the Executive Branch] also
sought to limit the scope of the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment category-which they reasonably viewed as ambiguous. The
result of their efforts was to take some of the conduct that arguably
would fall within the Convention and place it outside, at least under
the United States' understanding of its obligations. Put differently, the
Executive Branch sought to raise the bar for establishing that either
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment had taken place.2 7
Although there may be a legal necessity for distinguishing torture
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading conduct, there is a greater need for
maintaining what an ancient commentator called the Tao (or moral
law) and what our military calls the moral high ground.2 It was this
distinction that contributed to the coercive interrogation undertaken
shortly after 9/11 and during our subsequent invasion of Afghanistan
and Iraq. The document referred to by some scholars as the "Bybee
Memorandum" was commissioned in response to a growing recalci-
trance from key al-Qaeda captives, 2 9 and it appears to have exploited
the "gray areas" noted above as much as conceivably possible.30
Naturally, when the interrogations undertaken pursuant to this
memorandum came to light, many commentators strenuously
objected. Some scholars have categorized the objections to torture
based on their philosophical underpinnings. For example, Professor
Louis Seidman made a useful distinction between "High-Minded Mor-
alists" who reject torture on a deontological ground and "Sophisticated
Punishment of Persons Under Custody or Control of the United States Government"
and "Additional Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment." 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (Supp. 2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000dd-0 (Supp. 2006).
27. Parry, supra note 18, at 1042.
28. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 1 (Lionel Giles trans., Special Edition Books 2009)
(circa 500 B.C.); see also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 3-24: COUNTERIN-
SURGENCY 7-2 to 7-3 (2006) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
29. Kathleen Clark, Lawyers' Roles and the War on Terror, I J. NAT'L SECURITY L. &
POL'Y 455, 457-58 (2005).
30. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 72 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2008).
20101 567
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Machiavellians" who wish to use torture but balk at the consequences
of publicly acknowledging its use. 3' He notes that moralists often
engage in a form of willful blindness. While they make "symbolic
statement[s] about [torture's] absolute unacceptability" and reject it as
an article of faith, moralists refuse to consider suffering that might be
caused by failing to use it. 32 On the other hand, Machiavellians "pur-
port to understand what the Moralists ignore-the possibility that tor-
ture might sometimes work and might sometimes produce benefits
that make it worth the price. '33 But Machiavellians still want to keep
torture out of the public eye because they think debate will result in
"too much [torture,] because torture will then be legitimated; [or] too
little because public revulsion will get in the way of dirty work that has
to be done."34
On the other hand, a few commentators have contended that coer-
cive methods can be properly contained and should or must be
employed in the War on Terror. For instance, Professors Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule contended that coercive interrogation should be
legal and regulated:
[C]oercive interrogation is not special at all. If it is agreed that coer-
cive interrogation is justified in certain circumstances, even narrow
circumstances, there is no sense in treating it as "illegal" but subject to
ex post political or legal defenses. It should be made legal, albeit sub-
ject to numerous legal protections-again, in this way like police shoot-
ings, wartime killings, preventive detentions, capital punishment, and
other serious harms. The law should treat coercive interrogation the
way it typically treats coercive governmental practices. Such practices
are subject to a standard set of regulations defined ex ante: punish-
ment of officials who use these instruments without a good justifica-
tion, official immunity when they are used in good faith, various
restrictions on the type of instrument that may be used, ex ante protec-
tions such as warrants, and so forth.35
Professor Alan Dershowitz also made a noteworthy point-which
he felt the need to repeat in the face of widespread and probably mis-
guided outrage 36 -when he argued that, since coercive interrogation is
virtually certain to go on whether or not we approve of it, we should
31. Seidman, supra note 9, at 883.
32. Id. at 883.
33. Id. at 885.
34. Id.
35. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104
MICH. L. REv. 671, 674 (2006) (footnote omitted).
36. Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE, supra note 8, at 257, 265-66
(noting that Professor Dershowitz was called "Torquemada Dershowitz" among other
[Vol. 32:561568
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try to minimize its occurrence by seeking warrants for its use. 37 Of
course, ex ante review and torture warrants give rise to more questions
about the "routinization" or calcification of using coercive interroga-
tion,38 but we agree that the country needs "a candid and serious
engagement with the advantages and disadvantages of torture. '39 We
contend that many of the arguments for and against coercive interroga-
tion do not fully address the nature of interrogation and thus fail to
contend adequately with problems that go beyond tormenting the
body of a defenseless prisoner, such as torture's effect on the overall
strategy of counterinsurgency, on our country's moral certainty, and
on our warfighters' esprit de corps. Thus, many current objections can-
not properly answer whether or when torture is permissible as circum-
stances change.
II. PAIN, SUFFERING, AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL
This part begins with a summary of the physical basis of pain.
The cellular and physiological events that give rise to the perception of
pain are too complex to address here in full;4 ° suffice it to say that
distant fibers of various types transmit electrical action potentials
when stimulated.4 ' When they fire depends on the type of cell to
which they are attached: some fire in response to a change in tempera-
ture, while others fire in response to pressure, vibration, and so on;
some encode damage to the skin (sharp pain), others to tendon and
bone (aches), and others to viscera.42 Distant fibers transmit informa-
tion in response to pain immediately by transient action potentials and
slowly by longer-acting chemical signals, propagating the signal
upwards to the dorsal root of the spinal cord.43 The spinal cord
receives these signals from the dorsal root and transmits them upward
via three tracts-two directed to specific areas of the cortex (the con-
scious mind) through the thalamus and a third to the periaqueductal
gray matter in the midbrain (which releases opioids to block pain sig-
things in response to his suggestion that torture will occur and that it should be regu-
lated rather than ignored).
37. Id. at 257.
38. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
39. Seidman, supra note 9, at 885.
40. For an excellent but relatively brief explanation for the layman, see PATRICK
DAvIt WALL, PAIN: THE SCIENCE OF SUFFERING 31-41 (2000).
41. ERIC KANDEL, PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 472 (5th ed. 2008).
42. Id. at 473-74.
43. Id. at 474.
2010] 569
9
Falvey and Eck: Holding the High Ground: The Operational Calculus of Torture and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
nals).44 Other areas of the brain project across the cortex and down-
ward to the dorsal root and thus have a profound and interrelated
impact on the signals that reach the cortex.45 The interaction between
these functional elements gives rise to the complex cognitive experi-
ence everyone knows as pain.
Because many areas interact with the pathways that encode pain,
the experience of pain is highly dependent on the physiology, history,
and cognitive state of the subject.46 The thalamus may have particular
relevance for the interaction between the raw signal indicating damage
and the experience of pain insofar as it is the gateway through which
most pain signals reach the cortex. In fact, each mode of sensation
(smell, sight, etc.) has a parallel pathway to the thalamus, and the
somatosensory cortex has pathways that reach back to the thalamus.47
Thus, the conscious mind interacts with painful stimuli; it is subject to
pain signals and acts upon them, within the brain, and at the junction
of distant fibers and the spinal cord.
In light of studies on the personal experience of this interaction,
pain questionnaires often focus on categorizing a patient's entire expe-
rience of pain in terms of its sensory, affective, and evaluative
aspects-i.e., the stimulus itself (hot, burning, scalding, searing), what
the stimulus did to the subject (exhausting, sickening, punishing), and
the degree of suffering involved (annoying, miserable, unbearable). 48
While there is clearly a neurological basis for the evaluation of pain
even before the subject is truly conscious of it,4 9 the subject's ex post
comprehension of the situation is also critical to the synthetic experi-
ence of pain.5 0 This biological reality points to an important theoreti-
cal distinction: coercion, which occurs when an interrogator overloads
a detainee's will by magnifying the cognitive experience of pain while
inhibiting the detainee's self-control, is impermissible when the source
of pressure or the mode of inhibiting self-control is dehumanizing,
regardless of the brutality of the particular technique used. This dis-
tinction allows one to approve the technique employed in the "Chris-
44. Id. at 475, 482.
45. See id. at 480-85.
46. Id. at 481, 483.
47. Id. at 343, 483.
48. See WALL, supra note 40, at 27-29. An unusual condition called asymbolia for
pain arises in patients who have lesions of the insular cortex: they simply do not care
when exposed to painful stimuli. See KANDEL, supra note 41, at 482.
49. ERIC KANDEL, IN SEARCH OF MEMORY: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SCIENCE OF MIND
343-44 (2006).
50. KANDEL, supra note 41, at 481-82.
570 [Vol. 32:561
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tian burial case '' 5 1 -pressure with its source in the suspect's own moral
notions, unmagnified by severe disturbances to the suspect's homeo-
static condition-while rejecting relatively clear instances of coercion
and forced confession based on mock executions, starvation, sedation,
or prolonged sleep deprivation. 2
Obviously, physical torture has long-lasting sequelae ranging from
permanent disfigurement to persistent mental trauma. 3 One recent
survey of refugees compared the sequelae from physical and psycho-
logical methods of torture and concluded that psychological torture
produced more persistent sequelae than physical torture.54 Likewise,
the European Court of Human Rights found that terrorism suspects
swept up by the dragnet in Northern Ireland manifested significant
sequelae after being subjected to the "five techniques. ''5 5 While the
court determined that the techniques were cruel, inhuman, and
degrading but not torture,5 6 the captured Irishmen appear to have suf-
fered long-lasting harm consistent with that noted in victims of tor-
ture.5 7 In any event, it is clear that people who have suffered
prolonged pain show substantial changes in the architecture of their
brains.58 Studies on the effect of learned fear in mice suggest that
some of these changes involve sensitization and up-regulation of the
regions that initially detected the stimulus.5 9 These studies coincide
with an intuitive conclusion that psychological coercion will have per-
sistent deleterious effects on the mind of the subject.
Our critique of the objections to and defenses of torture is guided
by this model of distant stimuli being used to create midbrain and
cortical suffering and of the long-term effects of overload. If the long-
51. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
52. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 2-22.3, HuMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 5-75 (2006) [hereinafter HICO MANUAL], available at http://
www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf (listing acts that are
prohibited during interrogation).
53. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 171-74.
54. See generally M. Vorbruiggen & H.U. Baer, Humiliation: The Lasting Effect of
Torture, 172 MIL. MED. 29 (Supp. I 2007).
55. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25, para. 104, 167
(1978); JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE
4-8 (2000) (noting that the "five techniques" included wall standing, hooding, noise
bombardment, sleep deprivation, and food and water deprivation; and that the men
subjected to these techniques suffered from extensive psychological after-effects such
as panic attacks, nightmares, and so on).
56. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 167.
57. CONROY, supra note 55, at 8.
58. KANDEL, supra note 41, at 481.
59. Id. at 346-47.
20101
11
Falvey and Eck: Holding the High Ground: The Operational Calculus of Torture and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:561
term effects of psychological coercion and cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing conduct are as bad as or worse than purely physical torture, the
distinction between torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treat-
ment is much less logical than may initially appear. Likewise, if the
sequelae of psychological coercion are more crippling to what makes a
person human and a society just, the distinction becomes little more
than a balm for the conscience. And if the harms involved include the
captors as well as the captives, the calculus of coercive interrogation
could shift significantly in the direction of an absolute ban rather than
controlled use.
In addition, these studies cast doubt on whether physical pain of
the sort envisioned by the Convention's limitations is of much value as
an intelligence-gathering tool. The CIA concluded that the use of
direct, physical pain breeds resistance; thus, pain must instead be
inflicted by the subject upon himself (as in prolonged stress posi-
tions).6° Accordingly, the techniques forbidden by the Convention on
Torture are only likely to be employed by unsophisticated agents.6 1
60. See CIA, supra note 4, at 94. The KUBARK Manual explains that
[w]hen the individual is told to stand at attention for long periods, an inter-
vening factor is introduced. The immediate source of pain is not the interro-
gator but the victim himself. The motivational strength of the individual is
likely to exhaust itself in this internal encounter .... As long as the subject
remains standing, he is attributing to his captor the power to do something
worse to him, but there is actually no showdown of the ability of the interro-
gator to do so.
[However,] [i]ntense pain is quite likely to produce false confessions,
concocted as a means of escaping from distress. A time-consuming delay
results, while investigation is conducted and the admissions are proven
untrue. During this respite the interrogatee can pull himself together. He
may even use the time to think up new, more complex "admissions" that take
still longer to disprove.
Id. at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original). The recur-
ring theme is repeated here as well: physical pain is merely a crude tool for creating
psychological pain. The Manual goes on to point out that
[t]he threat of coercion usually weakens or destroys resistance more effec-
tively than coercion itself. The threat to inflict pain, for example, can trigger
fears more damaging than the immediate sensation of pain. In fact, most
people underestimate their capacity to withstand pain. The same principle
holds for other fears: sustained long enough, a strong fear of anything vague
or unknown induces regression, whereas the materialization of the fear, the
infliction of some form of punishment, is likely to come as a relief.
Id. at 90-91.
61. This is not to say that pain doesn't work at all. As an Army interrogator
recently noted, "If coercion doesn't work, why would the agency go to the trouble?"
CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AL
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Focusing on the physical methods involved in coercion ignores the fun-
damental goal of coercive interrogation,62 which is the creation of
unbearable psychological pressure from which the subject may escape
only through compliance.63 A more theoretically and biologically
accurate notion of interrogation recognizes that the pain of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading conduct is simply a crude way of reach-
ing and recruiting the subject's higher cognitive functions.64 It also
points to a central question for policymakers as technology and
QAEDA 477 (2004). Of course, the simple, brutal techniques that are still likely to be
used in places like Africa and the Middle East are problematic for those concerned
with human rights; however, we are concerned here with the United States and the
Western powers.
62. CIA, supra note 4, at 83 ("All coercive techniques are designed to induce
regression.").
63. Many techniques that depend on building rapport eventually employ the exact
same method-love of family, hate of comrades, futility, and so on. See generally MAT-
THEW ALEXANDER & JOHN BRUNING, How TO BREAK A TERRORIST: THE U.S. INTERRO-
GATORS WHO USED BRAINS, NOT BRUTALITY, TO TAKE DOWN THE DEADLIEST MAN IN IRAQ
(2008). Is it simply a question of what pressures are permissible? The KUBARK Man-
ual continues:
[T~he result of external pressures of sufficient intensity is the loss of those
defenses most recently acquired by civilized man: the capacity to carry out
the highest creative activities, to meet new, challenging, and complex situa-
tions, to deal with trying interpersonal relations, and to cope with repeated
frustrations. Relatively small degrees of homeostatic derangement, fatigue,
pain, sleep loss, or anxiety may impair these functions. As a result, most
people who are exposed to coercive procedures will talk and usually reveal
some information that they might not have revealed otherwise.
.Tlhe response to coercion typically contains at least three important
elements: debility, dependency, and dread. Prisoners have reduced viability,
are helplessly dependent on their captors for the satisfaction of their many
basic needs, and experience the emotional and motivational reactions of
intense fear and anxiety. Among the American POW's pressured by the Chi-
nese Communists, the DDD syndrome in its full-blown form constituted a
state of discomfort that was well-nigh intolerable.
CIA, supra note 4, at 83-84 (internal quotation marks omitted) (original alterations
omitted).
64. In a sense, then, coercive interrogation and warfare are fundamentally akin:
they are both ways to force an opponent to do something against his will. See BEVIN
ALEXANDER, How WARS ARE WON: THE THIRTEEN RULES OF WAR FROM ANCIENT GREECE
TO THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2003). This kinship gives rise to a simple defense of torture
which contends that, since one can kill the enemy during war, and since torture is less
grave of a harm than killing because the subject can go on enjoying at least some of the
good things in human life after torture, then one must be able to torture an enemy
during war. But if the problem with torture is its effect on the torturer, this defense
loses whatever viability it may have.
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neurophysiology advance: namely, if other, more subtle ways were
found to commandeer a subject's will, would they be objectionable
under the current understanding of torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading conduct?
For instance, experimentation and diagnostic imaging have given
medical researchers extensive insights into the particular areas of the
brain that generate and regulate aggression, pleasure, memory, fear,
speech, despair, and so on.65 In addition, doctors have made advances
toward treating severe depression by directly applying a microvolt cur-
rent to a specific area associated with the thalamus.66 Other studies
have suggested that transcranial ultrasonic stimulation could produce
comparable effects without invasive surgery. 67 Likewise, pharmaco-
logical researchers have long sought chemical means to offset the
effects of conditions like prolonged sleep deprivation and chronic
pain.61 Could the knowledge gained in these studies be used to gener-
ate fatigue, pain, terror, or despair in normal detainees to facilitate
interrogation? We can see no insurmountable obstacle to using these
or similar techniques to produce the same cognitive states sought by
psychological coercion, while (the practicalities of surgery aside) the
people using them could claim to have clean hands. "After all," they
could say, "all we did was strap the prisoner in a chair in front of a pair
of metal coils for a few hours. He never even saw them, and we didn't
put a scratch on him-just eight hours of sleep and three meals a day,
which is more than we get!"
Regarding the philosophical implications of this notion of coer-
cion, one well-known but particularly noteworthy perspective on tor-
ture concluded that physical pain cannot break a man; rather, a man
must break himself. The late Vice Admiral James Stockdale was shot
down over Vietnam and became a high-ranking officer in the darkest
Vietnamese POW camps during his seven-year-long incarceration.69
He endured-and commanded others who endured-genuinely hor-
65. KANDEL, supra note 41, at 365-66.
66. See, e.g., Helen S. Mayberg et al., Deep Brain Stimulation for Treatment-Resistant
Depression, NEURON, Mar. 3 2005, at 651-60.
67. See, e.g., David H. Avery et al., Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in the Acute
Treatment of Major Depressive Disorder: Clinical Response in an Open-label Extension
Trial, 69 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 441 (2008).
68. See, e.g., Francisco Paulino Dubiela et al., Inverse Benzodiazepine Agonist P-CCM
Does Not Reverse Learning Deficit Induced by Sleep Deprivation, 469 NEUROSCIENCE LEr-
TERS 169 (2010).
69. STUART I. ROCHESTER & FREDERICK T. KILEY, HONOR BOUND: AMERICAN PRISONERS
OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973, at 145 (1999).
[Vol. 32:561574
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rific conditions, including regular torture.7 ° Two of his many insights
are particularly relevant to our discussion. First, he discovered in the
"laboratory of human behavior" that fear and guilt-i.e., the loss of
moral certainty after reaching the limits of physical endurance and
cracking7l-are what break the will, not physical pain:
It's hard to discuss in public the real-life challenges of that laboratory
because people ask all the wrong questions: How was the food? That's
always the first one, and in a place like I've been, that's so far down the
scale you want to cry. Did they harm you physically? What was the
nature of the device they used to harm you? Always the device or the
truth serum or the electric shock treatment-all of which would totally
defeat the purpose of a person seriously trying to break down your
will. All those things would give you a feeling of moral superiority,
which is the last thing he would want to have happen. I'm not talking
about brainwashing; there is no such thing. I'm talking about having
looked over the brink and seen the bottom of the pit and realized that
truth of the linchpin of Stoic thought: that the thing that brings a man
down is not pain but shame!
72
Admiral Stockdale's insight coincides with a penetrating objection
to the evils of torture. Professor Seidman noted that the true evil in
torture is that it strips away the thing that makes us most human:
The problem with torture is not just that the victim's will is comman-
deered but that it is commandeered by the dehumanizing realization
that all that we associate with being human is an illusion. Threats to
the body uniquely carry this consequence because they alone lead us
to forsake the version of ourselves that is not simply a corporeal
machine. It follows that although torture's detractors are right to focus
on pain, many of them are mistaken about the role that pain plays. It is
not the pain itself that is the essence of torture's evil. it is rather what
the pain produces-the terrible betrayal of our self-understanding of
human life.7 3
Consequently, Seidman suggests, torture uncovers the abyss beneath
the veil of society, exposing our professions of morality and humanity
as no more than pleasant fictions:
Torture's truth, then, is that all of our promises to ourselves and to
others are ultimately contingent. In related, albeit distinguishable,
ways, torture shows us a truth about ourselves as individuals and as a
70. Id. at 146-48, 151, 161.
71. JAMES BOND STOCKDALE, COURAGE UNDER FIRE: TESTING EPICTETUS'S DocTRINES IN
A LABORATORY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1993), available at http://media.hoover.org/
documents/978-0-8179-3692- ll.pdf.
72. Id. at 18-19.
73. Seidman, supra note 9, at 907.
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society. In the most direct and literal sense, torture teaches us as indi-
viduals that we are slaves to our bodies and that our beliefs, our values,
and our moral obligations-in short, all that makes us human-count
for nothing when our bodies are at stake. And while this is true liter-
ally about the human body, it is also true metaphorically about the
body politic. When it comes to it, we as human beings will do
whatever it takes to stop the pain, just as we as societies will do
whatever it takes to preserve our corporate identity.74
Quoting a famous member of the French Resistance who was tortured
by the Gestapo, Seidman suggests that shame and the loss of trust are
the true harms involved in torture, not pain or the loss of autonomy:
"Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the
world. The shame of destruction cannot be erased. Trust in the world,
which already collapsed in part at the first blow, but in the end, under
torture, fully, will not be regained."75
However, another of Admiral Stockdale's insights is particularly
relevant here. Following the Stoics, Stockdale said that "there can be
no such thing as being the victim of another. You can only be a victim
of yourself. ' 76 Accordingly, a Stoic would regard a person who places
his "trust" in the world-or anything else outside his will-as funda-
mentally misguided: "Whoever then would be free, let him wish noth-
ing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others; else he must
necessarily be a slave." 77 The Stoic's radical revaluation of the notion
of harm permitted Marcus Aurelius to write to himself after the death
of three newborn children that one should not pray against losing
one's child, but against fearing such a loss. 78 This proper notion of
harm (and its concomitant notion of good as only that which contrib-
utes to justice and good character) places one beyond the reach of the
guilt and fear necessary for torture to subvert the will-assuming, of
course, that the interrogation techniques employed cannot perma-
nently drive the subject into psychosis and utterly circumvent his
74. Id. at 886.
75. Id. at 906 (quoting Jean Amry, Torture, in ART FROM THE ASHES: A HOLOCAUST
ANTHOLOGY 121, 136 (Lawrence L. Langer ed., Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella Rosenfeld
trans., 1995)).
76. STOCKDALE, supra note 71, at 5.
77. EPICTETUS, Enchiridion, in THE MORAL DISCOURSES OF EPicTErus 255, 259 (Eliza-
beth Carter trans., 2007); see also STOCKDALE, supra note 71, at 10 (discussing this
admonition).
78. See MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 156 (eremy Collier trans., Alice Zimmern
rev. 1896).
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rational faculties. 79 However, the Stoic answer to Seidman's notion of
torture's truth is so impressive in part because it seems so difficult to
attain. Limiting oneself to things truly within one's control is pro-
foundly liberating, but it is nevertheless a radical departure from the
common understanding of good and evil as pleasant and painful.
Accordingly, the Stoic answer to torture is a vital insight. But Seid-
man's notion of revealing the abyss must also be a practical considera-
tion, as it will probably be the operative understanding for many of
those who experience coercive interrogation-whether as subjects,
interrogators, commanders, colleagues, or simply as part of the society
which employs it, defensively or otherwise.
Returning again to the contemporary debate, we suggest that
whatever criticisms may be leveled at the Bush administration during
the years following 9/11,80 its conclusions about al-Qaeda as "unlawful
combatants" were logical."1 The Geneva Conventions were designed to
ensure that the great nations of the world would never again fight an
all-out war. Ideally, a nation that abstains from using the more ruth-
less options available during combat can expect reciprocation from its
enemies, limiting (as much as possible) the unnecessary harms
inflicted on soldiers and noncombatants. But the Conventions specifi-
cally require, among other things, that the parties march openly as
uniformed soldiers, so belligerents captured while engaged in espio-
nage cannot claim the protections offered to prisoners of war.8 2 The
79. This, of course, is the point of sensory deprivation. The CIA appears to have
thought that a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis was effective as well.
See ALFRED McCoy, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 27 (2006).
80. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, TiHE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 329 (Anchor 2009) (2008) (arguing
that Abu Ghraib was the result of irresponsible leadership rather than a few bad
apples).
81. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http:/
/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11 /print/20011113-
27.html.
82. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 43(2), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that only lawful combatants may participate in hostilities); id. art.
51(3) (stating that civilians lose their protections if they participate in combat);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(2), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (stating that lawful combatants are members of
armed forces, militia, or resistance groups that wear fixed and distinctive emblems that
are recognizable from a distance, that openly carry their arms, that follow an estab-
lished chain-of-command, and that conduct all operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war).
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need for this requirement is obvious to any first-year contracts student.
How could a party maintain its benefit of the bargain-the expectation
of reciprocal abstention from advantageous but uncivilized gains-if
the other could seek out those gains in secret?
Sub-national belligerents such as al-Qaeda present a comparable
situation. In game theory terms, nations sign the Conventions because
it is a signal of their type-non-torturers, non-users of biological and
chemical weapons, and so on-a signal they know other nations will
recognize. Signatories hope that when other nations consider this sig-
nal in light of an expectation of repeated future interactions and the
high "transaction costs" of warfare outside the Conventions, each will
eschew the cost of preparing, using, and defending against forbidden
weapons and means and methods of warfare, and the world as a whole
will benefit from the "efficiency gains" of life without the darker pos-
sibilities of modern warfare. 83 However, there is no possibility of rea-
sonable certainty of reciprocation from sub-national organizations
that lack an enforceable chain of command. This is especially true for
organizations like al-Qaeda, which operate by hiding in independent
cells among the noncombatants that the Conventions were designed to
protect and which lack the formal command structure present in
Vietnam.84
83. If we carry the game theory analogy a bit further, however, we note that each
signatory must be willing to breach-and signal that they are willing to breach-in
order to maintain a credible threat to enforce compliance from the other "players."
84. Jefferson Reynolds has explained the Viet Cong's strategies as follows:
Vietnamese leadership described the Vietnam conflict as a "people's revolu-
tion," requiring the incorporation of the entire Vietnamese population into its
defense. The strategy to incorporate the populace into the conflict increased
the difficulty in distinguishing between civilian and military objects, and pro-
moted collateral damage. The Vietcong commonly took advantage of objects
normally legally immune from attack to conduct military operations and to
obtain sanctuary for military personnel, equipment and supplies. Such
objects included religious and historical buildings, private dwellings or other
civilian structures. In some cases, the U.S. restricted targeting protected
objects used as sanctuary. For example, dikes on the Red River being used as
platforms for air defense were restricted from attack. Notwithstanding Viet-
cong transgressions in commingling military personnel and resources with
the civilian population, their ability to leverage public sympathy from U.S.
bombing campaigns and incidents of collateral damage was novel and well
planned. The Vietcong ultimately achieved a strategic advantage that contrib-
uted to efforts to discredit U.S. operations and force a withdrawal from the
conflict.
Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56
A.F. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (2005) (citations omitted). Though lacking a strict central com-
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Terrorist organizations, which can only or will only fight by
exploiting the norms underlying the Geneva Conventions and the cus-
tomary laws of war, are hostis humani generi akin to pirates,8 5 and
therefore it is unprincipled as well as irrational to treat them just like
signatories. Consequently, any coherent objection to using coercive
interrogation against enemies like al-Qaeda must be based on a pru-
dential or principled consideration of the effect of such conduct on the
nation employing it rather than legal or ethical arguments about the
status or rights of the captive.
In our view, it is prudent to avoid coercive methods like this
because they will diminish the fighting spirit of our armed forces by
undermining our belief that our cause is just. The Chinese general
Sun Tzu claimed around 500 B.C. that he could predict victory or
defeat by measuring the qualities of the opposing armies.8 6 Foremost
among these qualities was the Tao, the "Moral Law," which "causes the
people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will fol-
low him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger." 7 This
notion is not merely a relic of ancient beliefs; for example, Mao Tse-
tung, leader of the "People's Liberation Army" during the civil war
against the Kuomintang government under Chaing Kai-shek (arguably
the most effective guerilla campaign in history), 8 successfully adopted
it during the Chinese alliance against the Japanese Empire.89
mand, al-Qaeda nevertheless operates from a basic core of beliefs based on the Quran
and various schools of interpretive "sayings" about the Prophet (hadith)-e.g., that the
duty to engage in jihad is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) of every faithful Muslim
when infidels invade Muslim lands. See Osama bin Ladin, World Islamic Front State-
ment Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, in AL-QAEDA IN ITS OwN WORDS 53,
54-55 (Gilles Kepel & Jean-Pierre Milelli eds., 2008). And like the Vietcong, al-Qaeda
skillfully uses channels of mass communication to generate outrage, both within its
own sphere of influence and in the West. See Omar Saghi, Osama bin Ladin, the Iconic
Orator, in AL-QAEDA IN ITS OwN WORDS, supra, at 11, 39.
85. See Douglas R. Burgess, Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 293 (2006).
86. SUN Tzu, supra note 28, at 2.
87. Id. at 1.
88. See ALEXANDER, supra note 64, at 28-31 (detailing how Mao's cultivation of the
Chinese peasants' support and dissipation of the Kuomintang forces permitted the
technologically inferior Red Army to constantly hold the initiative and select favorable
engagements, resulting in the establishment of a regime that still exists today in the
world's most populous nation).
89. See MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERILLA WARFARE 63-71 (Samuel B. Griffith 11 trans.,
2000) (1961). Mao gave the following moralistic prediction:
The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that
reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government, as do
vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause is right-
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Principles are important to soldiers, who need to believe in the
justice of their actions to have an effective fighting spirit, especially in
the often unpredictable battle against asymmetric foes.90 Likewise,
Admiral Stockdale noted that in Vietnam the ability to resist the
despair of captivity and the Vietnamese attempts at indoctrination
depended in part on the soldier's conviction that he had the moral
eous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the
invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries, including even Japan
itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and
China will win.
Id. at 69-70. In fact, Mao ruthlessly tortured political rivals and their families. See,
e.g., PHILIP SHORT, MAO: A LIFE 272-74 (2001) (describing interrogations and forced
confessions at the "Hall of Sincerity and Respect"). However, in spite of reality, Mao
was a skillful manipulator of the perception of the moral high ground; for instance,
when fighting Chaing Kai-shek, Mao portrayed a year-long, eight thousand-mile retreat
as proof of moral and military superiority of the Red Army:
[Tihe Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a
manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine. . . . [H]as history ever
witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months we were under
daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes, while
on land we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge
force of several hundred thousand men, and we encountered untold difficul-
ties and dangers on the way; yet by using our two legs we swept across a
distance of more than twenty thousand li .... The Long March is a mani-
festo. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes,
while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like,
are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue,
obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has
announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of
the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how
could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the
great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seed-
ing-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will
sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In
a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the
enemy.
Mao Tse-tung, On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, in 2 COLONIALISM: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1058, 1062 (Melvin E. Page et
al. eds., 2003). Of course, this fundamental disconnect between reality and perception
probably led to the corrupt, myopic regime that eventually starved millions of Chi-
nese, goaded its youth to ruthlessly crush the traditions of one of the world's oldest
cultures, and held back the modernization of China for nearly half a century. See
DANIEL CHIROT, MODERN TYRANrs: THE POWER AND PREVALENCE OF EVIL IN OUR AGE
195-99, 205-06 (1996).
90. See CHRISTOPHER COKER, THE WARRIOR ETHOS: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE WAR
ON TERROR 133-35, 139-40 (2007).
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high ground.91 On the other hand, statements by Jane Fonda, Stokely
Carmichael, and Ramsey Clark "at once incensed and demoralized"
the POWs.9 2 Principles are also important to the democratic nations
that supply men and funding to wage war (whether or not they
acknowledge it): since democracies dislike protracted conflict and
have different wellsprings of fighting spirit than nationalistic, ideologi-
cal, or fanatical regimes, their fighting spirit must be carefully con-
served.93 Accordingly, we suggest that the routinization of torture
would have a corrosive effect on out warfighters' morale and our coun-
try's belief that the United States occupies the moral high ground in its
ongoing fight with al-Qaeda and jihadist extremism. Thus, no matter
what actionable intelligence could be obtained from torture, the effect
on our moral certainty and fighting spirit would constitute a defeat on
the broader battlefield that encompasses our and the world's percep-
tion of the West as a civilization dedicated to higher principles than
our enemies.
Of course, these very objections were put forward by the Judge
Advocates General.94 During the drafting of the Working Group
Report, Major General Jack Rives contended that,
[sihould any information regarding the use of the more extreme inter-
rogation techniques become public, it is likely to be exaggerated/dis-
torted in both the U.S. and international media. This could have a
negative impact on international, and perhaps even domestic, support
for the war on terrorism. Moreover, it could have a negative impact on
public perception of the U.S. military in general.
... [The use of the more extreme interrogation techniques simply
is not how the U.S. armed forces have operated in recent history. We
have taken the legal and moral "high-road" in the conduct of our mili-
tary operations regardless of how others may operate. Our forces are
trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they enter
active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of
conduct training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized
since the Viet Nam conflict when our POWs were subjected to torture
by their captors. We need to consider the overall impact of approving
extreme interrogation techniques as giving official approval and legal
91. ROCHESTER & KILEY, supra note 69, at 180.
92. Id.
93. See 2 ALFXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 344-45 (Francis Bowen
ed., Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed. 1863) (contrasting the superiority of reasoned disci-
pline in democratic armies with the blind obedience of aristocratic ones).
94. See generally Lederman, supra note 11 (summarizing the numerous JAG
memoranda).
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sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. forces
have consistently been trained are unlawful.9 5
Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler concurred, pointing out the
deleterious effect coercive interrogation could have on the armed
forces:
When assessing whether to use exceptional interrogation techniques,
consideration should be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S.
Armed Forces culture and self-image which suffered during the Viet-
nam conflict and at other times due to perceived law of war violations.
DOD policy indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in
1979 . . .greatly restored the culture and self-image of U.S. Armed
Forces by establishing high benchmarks of compliance with the princi-
ples and spirit of the law of war and humane treatment of all persons
in U.S. Armed Forces custody.
96
Professor Luban raised a similar objection about implementing
coercive interrogation in the civilian sphere: any organized body cre-
ates its own expansive network of aides, subcontractors, and instruc-
tors who become more or less instrumental to the business at hand.9 7
However, Professor Peters provides the most eloquent explanation of
what we regard as the fundamental problem with torture and coercive
interrogation, whether physical or psychological:
Societies that do not recognize the dignity of the human person, or
who profess to recognize it and fail to do so in practice, or recognize it
95. Memorandum from Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Air Force,
to Working Group (Feb. 5, 2003).
96. Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Marine
Corps, to Gen. Counsel, U.S. Air Force (Feb. 27, 2003).
97. See Luban, supra note 16, at 1446. Luban writes:
Should universities create an undergraduate course in torture? Or should the
subject be offered only in police and military academies? Do we want federal
grants for research to devise new and better techniques? Patents issued on
high-tech torture devices? Companies competing to manufacture them?
Trade conventions in Las Vegas? Should there be a medical sub-specialty of
torture doctors, who ensure that captives do not die before they talk? The
questions amount to this: Do we really want to create a torture culture and
the kind of people who inhabit it? The ticking time bomb distracts us from
the real issue, which is not about emergencies, but about the normalization
of torture.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Indeed, it is frightening to contemplate the apparatus that
already existed to produce the data from which the KUBARK Manual was written. See,
e.g., McCoy, supra note 79, at 44-46 (detailing a CIA project in which unwitting
patients seeking psychological treatment were subjected to drug-induced comas, elec-
troshock, and extended periods of sensory deprivation inside a football helmet playing
looped statements such as "Your mother hates you," resulting in profound and long-
lasting trauma).
[Vol. 32:561582
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only in highly selective circumstances, become, not simply societies
with torture, but societies in which the presence of torture transforms
human dignity itself, and therefore all individuals and social life. And
a society which voluntarily or indifferently includes among its mem-
bers both victims and torturers ultimately leaves no conceptual or
practical room for anyone who insists upon being neither.9"
III. A MORE FUNDAMENTAL VIEW OF TORTURE
In our view, the overall strategy of counterinsurgency, our coun-
try's moral certainty, and our warfighters' esprit de corps deserve more
emphasis in the debate about torture and coercive interrogation
because their absence can permit certain dangerous scenarios, while
their inclusion can guide policymakers toward a safer, more success-
ful, and more effective use of interrogation. Of course, several objec-
tions leap to mind, not least of which is that this is simply a slippery
slope argument. 99 Though the slippery slope argument is commonly
considered a logical fallacy, Professor Eugene Volokh has noted that it
is fallacious only insofar as it mistakenly assumes that there is no prin-
cipled stopping point between what is in question and the terrible fate
that allegedly awaits. 100 Here, the force that pushes back against the
use of torture is the moral outrage of the public against the brutality
involved-and, as explained above, moral outrage against torture can
be trumped by other outrages, such as that generated by suicide
attacks. 01
History suggests that torture is not a safe tool for anyone at any
time. Even under a system of rigid hierarchy where torture was con-
trolled by explicit laws, it crept outward from its original bounds as
each new crime became terrible enough to warrant torture. 10 2 "Pre-
98. PETERS, supra note 3, at 187.
99. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 35, at 688.
100. Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARVARD L. REV. 1026,
1029 (2003).
101. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 8, at 291, 293-94.
102. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 25-26, 28-29. Under the Romans, torture was
originally used only for slaves in criminal cases or those convicted of crimen laesae
maestatis (the crime lessening majesty, of the emperor or of Rome itself); however,
eventually slaves could be tortured for evidence in certain civil cases, and humiliores
(free plebians) could be tortured if they were publicly dishonored or of "low condi-
tion." Id. at 30. "The infamous person, like the slave of old, lacks the dignitas to offer
voluntary testimony merely under questioning; torture must validate his testimony."
Id. at 31. But the privilege against torture was also eroded downward between the
second and fourth centuries-traitors (defined by the expansive whim of the emperor)
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cise, limited, and highly regulated in law and legal theory, torture
became quickly roughened in the hard world of applied law among the
hardened personnel of the court system. ' 10 3 Professors Posner and
Vermeule argued against this position:
The problem with this argument is ... [that] it is pure speculation,
belied by our experiences with other measures. Take capital punish-
ment. One could argue that killing convicted criminals is just as likely
to brutalize society as torturing them. Yet the trend has been in the
opposite direction. Historically, nations have cut back on capital pun-
ishment rather than expanding it; this has been driven by revulsion
against its use against minor criminals ....
The argument recalls the various "ratchet" theories, which hold
that the adoption of new law enforcement measures that restrict civil
liberties inevitably become entrenched, and thus the starting point
when new emergencies generate pressure for aggressive law enforce-
ment, so that there is always a downward pressure on civil liberties.
These theories have never been adequately defended. In the context of
torture, there have been many examples of western countries adopting
coercive interrogation and similar aggressive practices as temporary
measures to deal with a particular emergency-France in Algeria, Brit-
ain against the IRA-and then abandoning them when the emergency
is over. Israel uses coercive interrogation against suspected terrorists;
this practice has not spread to other settings, as far as we know. Far
from desensitizing the public to violence and pain, the use of coercive
interrogation and similar measures can inspire revulsion, and a
renewal of a commitment not to use them except in extreme
circumstances. 104
However, the situation may not be as simple as claimed. The cor-
rosive effects of torture on a society's mores and the armed forces'
fighting spirit could be immediate, but they could also take longer to
fully develop. The growth of torture in Rome and under Romano-
Canonical law took generations to expand outward to arbitrary or uni-
versal use, 10 5 while the movement from considering "monstering" as
an extreme to a baseline measure at Bagram occurred over the course
of a few years. 10 6 Similarly, who can say what harm the revelations of
as well as female poisoners, diviners and sorcerers, adulterers and those with unnatu-
ral lust, and Christians could all be tortured for evidence and/or punishment, regard-
less of station. Likewise, under Romano-Canonical law, what was originally reserved
for the lowest classes expanded via the doctrine of infamia and the crimen exceptum
until the fifteenth century, when anyone could be tortured. Id. at 61.
103. Id. at 69.
104. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 35, at 689-90 (footnotes omitted).
105. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 55.
106. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 61, at 405.
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misconduct in Vietnam have ultimately done to the fighting spirit of
the American people and its armed forces?' 7 Furthermore, it is not
clear whether the West has actually abandoned the techniques devel-
oped in Algiers, Northern Ireland, or Gaza, or how we will know when
the problems associated with organizations like al-Qaeda have ended,
or if they ever will.'08 And regarding revulsion, a sufficiently outraged
public could simply become comfortable with coercive interrogation
that resembles torture (i.e., become brutalized) rather than outraged
by it. Likewise, would a society gradually sliding downward into cor-
ruption notice that decline?' 0 9
107. See Lederman, supra note 11 (providing documentation demonstrating that
General Sandkuhler pointed to the extensive DOD efforts to repair the image of the
U.S. armed forces after Vietnam).
108. ROCHESTER & KILEY, supra note 69, at 180 (noting that the listing of countries
employing temporary measures to deal with a particular emergency does not include
Israel).
109. Consider Professor Peters' insight into modern torture:
Language that identifies torture with inhuman practices also presupposes an
anthropology, one shaped in the late eighteenth century out of old and new
principles of European thought. That anthropology has survived, barely, it
sometimes seems, into the late twentieth century, but there is no guarantee
that it will necessarily survive forever. It survived in part because it was
embodied in jurisprudence, governmental policies and institutions, and
international agreements, as well as in the literature of moral philosophy, in
the arts, and in a high and low cultural consensus, indeed, in sentiment as
well as law and morality. It may be possible to make torture disappear by
making it effectively illegal and dangerous to those who practice it, but it
seems necessary also to preserve the reason for making it illegal and danger-
ous-to preserve a notion of human dignity that, although not always meticu-
lously observed, is generally assumed .... All human beings are assumed by
this anthropology to possess a quality called human dignity. As Immanuel
Kant once observed, punishments or other forms of treatment may be consid-
ered inhuman when they become inconsistent with human dignity. It is
important to distinguish this operative idea of human dignity from what Mal-
ise Ruthven has acutely called the "threshold of outrage"-a fluctuating
notion of appropriate treatment of individuals depending on social status,
background, or class. The idea of human dignity must not be distracted by
momentary thresholds of outrage or momentary designations of sentiment.
It is sometimes easier to erode a large idea like that of human dignity slowly
from its distant edges rather than to risk the abrupt introduction of torture
outright in a society. It is easier to transform an anthropology slowly, for
with such a transformation, torture may appear as a logical and predictable
step.
PETERS, supra note 3, at 185-86.
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Consider, for instance, the growth in recent years of so-called "tor-
ture porn."11 If the ratchet effect is gradual enough, could each new
torque give rise to a moderate level of outrage that the next generation
finds palatable? Could torture become palatable as coercive interroga-
tion becomes more distant and less gory, as its objects appear less
human, and as the dangers of eschewing it become graver and more
horrifyingly presented on television dramas and twenty-four hour
cable news? And could the problems involved in dealing with regions
of the world marked by popular adherence to tyrannical regimes that
thrive on nationalism, xenophobia, and resentment ultimately lead us
into using the quick solution of coercion at the cost of losing our grip
on the principles and institutions that distinguish our way of life from
theirs?111
Assuming that this understanding of torture is valid, what effect
should it have on the current guidelines for interrogation? First, all
interrogators should focus on the use of "rapport-building" techniques
outlined in the Army's field manual on collecting human intelli-
gence,1 12 which are also commonly employed by criminal investigators
and the FBI. 1 13 These techniques (such as playing on detainee's love of
family) often proved more effective than "fear and control" techniques
during the hunt for Zarqawi. 14 In fact, several detainees (including a
member of the Shura Council) revealed details about al-Qaeda opera-
tives, safe houses, weapons, suicide bombs, and supply lines in Iraq-
however, none would give up their superiors out of fear of what al-
110. David Edelstein, Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn, NEW YORK,
Jan. 28, 2006, http://nymag.com/movies/features/15622 ("I'm baffled by how far this
new stuff goes-and by why America seems so nuts these days about torture.").
111. Compare CHIROT, supra note 89, at 410-12, 417 (analyzing the development of
tyrannical regimes in Germany, Russia, Cambodia, Argentina, and elsewhere, and
arguing that modern tyranny frequently results from the combination of unstable
regimes, national rage, and the desire to cleanse society from foreign corruption), with
Osama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the
Two Holy Sanctuaries, in AL-QAEDA IN ITS OWN WORDS, supra note 84, at 47, 47-50
(reciting a history of Western oppression of Muslims and exhorting them to take up
arms against the corrupt crusaders).
112. HICO MANUAL, supra note 52, at 8-3. Note that interrogators in Department of
Defense agencies are limited to the techniques approved in this Field Manual. See id.
at 8-1 ("The only authorized interrogation approaches and techniques are those
authorized by and listed in this manual, in accordance with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005."); COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 28, at D-5 ("The Detainee
Treatment Act established [the HICO Manual] as the legal standard. No techniques
other than those prescribed by the field manual are authorized by U.S. forces.").
113. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & BRUNING, supra note 63, at 22, 36.
114. Id. at 5.
[Vol. 32:561586
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol32/iss4/2
HOLDING THE HIGH GROUND
Qaeda would do to them and their families. 115 Nevertheless, rapport-
building eventually persuaded a key detainee to give up al-Rahman,
who drove a particular car whenever he went to see Zarqawi.1 1 6 U.S.
special forces followed the car, bombed its destination, and found
Zarqawi dying in the rubble.1 1 7
Of course, one difficult problem with the exclusive use of rapport-
building is that coercive interrogation (including waterboarding) was
only debated because high-ranking al-Qaeda captives began stone-
walling their interrogators. 1 8 Likewise, one interrogator noted that a
tough detainee who had been through United States detention before
knew that he would not be harmed, and knew that the evidence
against him was not tight enough to support conviction and execution
under Iraqi law-so he simply refused to talk.1 1 9 Faithful detainees
would also refuse to talk when they lapsed into a state of silent resigna-
tion to the will of Allah,1 20 a state that in some ways resembles the stiff
resistance among American POWs noted by Admiral Stockdale.12 1 In
fact, our military discovered an al-Qaeda training manual for opera-
tives taken prisoner by the United States. 12 2 It revealed every tech-
nique the detainees had been employing-stonewalling, vagueness, use
of cunyas (false names) and the Islamic calendar-and included an
entire section on the West.1 23 As one interrogator noted, the manual
115. See id. at 59, 117, 215-17. This fear was probably justified; the author claims
that his colleagues had witnessed videos of al-Qaeda operatives using power drills to
punish Iraqis who had given information to U.S forces. Id. at 43.
116. Id. at 275.
117. Id. at 278-79.
118. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://
documents.nytimes.com/justice-department-memos-on-interrogation-techniques/
page/I.
119. ALEXANDER & BRUNING, supra note 63, at 177.
120. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 61, at 286.
121. See STOCKDALE, supra note 76, at 15. Of course, everyone has a breaking point,
and each man eventually said more than name, rank, and serial number during his
years of captivity. Id. Nevertheless, the savvy POWs often turned forced confessions
or admissions to their own advantage, such as by lacing statements with double mean-
ings and claiming that the only two American pilots to resign in protest over Vietnam
were Clark Kent and Ben Davies. Id. at 16.
122. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 61, at 178.
123. Id. at 178-79. The al-Qaeda manual was exhaustive and probably written by
jihadists who had experience with detention in various countries:
Hold out on providing any information for at least twenty-four hours, it
said, to give "brothers" enough time to adjust their plans. The Americans
"will not harm you physically," the manual said, but "they must be tempted
into doing so. And if they do strike a brother, you must complain to the
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accurately detailed the way to exploit the American dedication to
human rights.124
Even if we are correct that the armed forces should use (and signal
that they will only use) interrogation techniques similar to those
employed by criminal investigators, 2 ' the problem of stonewalling
seems to leave only two alternatives: be content with silence and wait
out the detainee if possible, or hand the detainee over to someone else
for whom the moral high ground is not a critical consideration.
Accordingly, the only alternatives to waiting out a detainee appear to
be (1) giving non-military intelligence-gathering agencies the authority
to carry out coercive questioning (without publicly specifying exactly
what they may do to preserve an aura of fear), or (2) rendering high-
authorities immediately." It added that the baiting of Americans should be
sufficient to result in an attack that leaves "evidence." You could end the
career of an interrogator, maybe even prompt an international outcry, if you
could show the Red Cross a bruise or a scar. America's aversion to torture
was presented as a symbol of American weakness. The West didn't have the
stomach for such things, the book said, "because they are not warriors."
Throughout, the tone was condescending. "Brothers, they will not under-
stand our reasons [for fighting], and you must contrive to exploit their
ignorance."
Other sections were dedicated to resisting other Middle Eastern interro-
gators' methods. These were clearly regarded as more formidable than West-
ern approaches. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco-practically every country had a
paragraph describing ways of obtaining information, often in language that
seemed to indicate the author had firsthand experience. Included were hand-
drawn pictures about positions "brothers can expect" to be placed in: sitting
on the ground with their hands tied to their ankles; kneeling with a stick
behind their knees, cutting off circulation to the legs; hanging from their
arms tied behind their backs. One picture was like a Michelangelo drawing
of the body, with each part labeled with a description of another horror.
Gouge out eyes. Cut out tongue. It talked about filleting people, skinning
their arms with knives. Dropping cement blocks on knees. Drilling knee-
caps. Ripping fingernails off. Pouring boiling water on a prisoner's skin.
There was even a picture of Chinese water torture, with a funnel releasing a
series of drips on a prisoner's head ....
Id. at 179-80.
124. See id. at 180 (noting that the "most infuriating thing" about the terrorists'
training manual was how accurately it described their American captors' limitations,
which permitted al-Qaeda to lie, refuse to talk, or change their stories with impunity).
125. This proposal is underway, although centering the program within the bounda-
ries of the United States may unnecessarily hamper field interrogators who are making
significant progress with recently captured detainees. See Anne E. Kornblut, New Unit
to Question Key Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/23/AR2009082302598.html.
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value detainees to countries that detainees believe will use coercive
methods.
The first option is objectionable because there is not enough
"acoustic separation" to allow the agencies like the CIA to use forbid-
den techniques without similarly undermining the nation's moral cer-
titude. An interrogator stated a very succinct and adequate objection
to allowing any U.S. agency to use techniques that resemble torture:
"The reason the United States should not torture prisoners is not
because it doesn't work. It is simply because it is wrong. It dehuman-
izes us, undermines our cause, and, over the long term, breeds more
enemies ... than coercive interrogation methods will ever allow us to
capture." 1 2 6
Any prolonged military campaign necessarily involves harm to
the local civilian population, and U.S. forces are trained to carefully
weigh the risks to noncombatants against the success of the mission at
hand and to use proportional rather than indiscriminate force in car-
rying out operations. 127 Counterinsurgency, an ethically and politi-
cally complex operation, 128 requires that U.S. forces carefully consider
their operations in light of the insurgency's strategy, a key part of
which is demoralizing the counterinsurgency and eroding its political
will by portraying it as illegitimate and unethical even by its own stan-
dards. 129 Likewise, an insurgency necessarily seeks the sympathy of
international bodies and relies on the civilian population for supply,
intelligence, and mobility. 130 Mao Tse-tung secured the support of the
Chinese peasants by seizing land and claiming he was distributing it to
the oppressed workers as recompense for years of bourgeois abuse,1
3 1
which became a model for Communist revolutionaries in Latin
America. 132 The Viet Cong tried to capitalize on the other side of the
coin-hiding within local population centers to force the U.S. Marines
either to withhold or to direct the damage from their superior fire-
power towards the local population and fuel resentment against the
foreign invader, which would increase Viet Cong recruitment and pop-
126. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 61, at 477.
127. See, e.g., COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7-5, 7-7.
128. Id. at 7-5.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., ERNESTO GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE: A METHOD 183 (1985)
("[G]uerrilla warfare is a people's war; to attempt to carry out this type of war without
the people's support is the prelude to inevitable disaster.").
131. See SHORT, supra note 89, at 177-78, 436-37.
132. See GuEvARA, supra note 130, at 51.
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ular support.' 33 Likewise, the insurgents in Algiers gained local and
international support when the French policy of interrogational tor-
ture by elite paratroopers became known to the native Algerians and to
the world.' 3 4
To pin down and strangle an insurgency, it must be separated
from its supply and shelter (i.e., from the popular support of the peo-
ple), 135 and to secure a nation plagued with insurgency, the civilian
population must regard the counterinsurgent force as beneficial,
strong, and morally superior. 136 This will necessarily shift more risk
to the counterinsurgency's warfighters, which is an unavoidable part of
the "burden of command." 137 However, applying force without dis-
criminating between the civilian population and the insurgents-
including during coercive interrogations, which necessarily involve
spillover because they take place when certainty is scarce 138-erodes
support for the government supported by the counterinsurgency and
pushes uncommitted actors to the insurgency's side.139 Accordingly,
permitting non-military intelligence agencies like the CIA or their con-
tractors to conduct coercive interrogations, even in order to obtain vital
intelligence, undermines our goals in Iraq and Afghanistan and weak-
ens the armed forces' long-term attack on the strategy underlying
jihadist extremism."'
On the other hand, the implicit threat of rendition to a Gulf state
worked well during interrogations in Afghanistan. In one instance, a
133. MARK MOYAR, PHOENIX AND THE BIRDS OF PREY: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM IN VIETNAM 285-86 (2007). Contrary to many popular media
accounts, U.S. forces did not use indiscriminate force against Vietnamese hamlets,
which is why the Viet Cong chose them as hiding places. Id. at 286-87.
134. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 133-35. The revelations actually led to the end of
the Fourth Republic and the creation of the Fifth. Id. at 133.
135. COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 28, at 1-23.
136. See, e.g., id. at 1-27, 5-14, 5-21 to -22; see also MoYAR, supra note 133, at
301-06 (detailing the decrease in support for the Viet Cong among rural Vietnamese
in the 1960s and 1970s due to improvements in the leadership and oversight of South
Vietnamese units and several crushing defeats of the Viet Cong forces).
137. COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7-3.
138. See HENRY SHUE, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 8, at 47, 54-55
(noting that, whether or not the subject of coercive interrogation is an enemy or neu-
tral and whether or not the subject has disclosed all he knows, he is likely to answer
the same way).
139. See COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 28, at 1-24. Consider, for
instance, what effect the Abu Ghraib photos must have on Iraqi support for the Coali-
tion government.
140. See id. at A-8 (distinguishing fighting insurgents, which is often not productive,
from fighting the insurgency's strategy).
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pair of skilled Army interrogators used the permissible threat of
returning a detainee to his native Algeria (where he believed he and his
family would be executed for aiding suicide bombers, a capital
offense) to learn two vital facts: (1) that, under pressure from the West
during 2001, the ruling council under Mullah Omar decided to force
out all terrorist groups and training camps in Afghanistan except for
al-Qaeda, and consequently bin Laden offered all the various factions'
leaders a deal to fly al-Qaeda flags and support al-Qaeda's aims in
order to stay; and (2) one of the assignments given pursuant to this
agreement was to poison the U.S. Embassy in Rome. 4 ' This informa-
tion led to the arrest of eight Moroccans who had eight pounds of
potassium ferrocyanide, a city map with the Rome Embassy circled,
and underground utility maps. 14 2 Later, interrogators prepared an
elaborate ruse, planting rumors that stoked the detainees' fears of
being sent to a Middle Eastern prison (whose reputation for cruelty
and torture was known throughout the Arab world), preparing mana-
cles and darkened goggles, and asking detainees to help translate
words like extradite and remand.'43 They recruited a confederate to
pose as a Gulf state colonel who walked through the cells with an inter-
rogator placing strips of duct tape on the detainees, writing "transport"
or "remain" on each of them in Arabic.' 44 Shortly thereafter, there was
an epidemic of mysteriously ill detainees who wanted to clarify their
original stories and rat out others, many of whom then followed them
into the booth expecting that the first wave of sick had given away
secrets to avoid the Gulf-bound plane.14 5
Still, the legality of rendition is fundamentally questionable, since
the United States' obligations under the Convention Against Torture
require that it "refuse extraditions and deportations where there is a
credible threat of torture or other human right violations of the person
to be removed."'146 While rapport-building must be the primary tool
for armed forces interrogators, it is probably insufficient, standing
alone, to gather all possible intelligence on terrorist organizations and
their plans. Rendition, however, is probably an inadequate solution
since it runs afoul of our international obligations and may undermine
141. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 61, at 171-73.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 354-63.
144. Id. at 360.
145. Id. at 361-63.
146. Eric C. Bales, Torturing the Rome Statute: The Attempt to Bring Guantanamo's
Detainees within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 16 TULSAJ. COMP.
& INT'L L. 173, 189 n.132 (2009) (citing United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 25).
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our cause just as much as performing coercive interrogations our-
selves. Likewise, although the threat of rendition has worked, it is not
a serious solution because the terrorists would soon learn that U.S.
policy was to make threats but not act on them. For the present, the
threat of rendition works because sometimes it actually happens. But
if the Third World and the people of the Middle East were to regard the
destination state as a puppet of imperialist Westerners, 147 we would
face the same problems with blowback we would have encountered if
we simply interrogated the detainees ourselves. More importantly, let-
ting foreign states do the dirty work of coercive interrogation could
actually be worse than doing it ourselves if we become complicit in the
uncontrolled use the darkest of the methods noted above. 148
CONCLUSION
Although some of the legal world's brightest lights have debated
torture and coercive interrogation, many objections are inadequate
insofar as they fail to address the deeper problems. The overemphasis
on brutality could lead policymakers to permit coercive methods that
are more subtle and less likely to evoke disgust in the public. However,
less innately horrifying methods can still undermine the humanity of
the subject, the user, and the society which employs them-in fact,
such weapons may actually be more dangerous precisely because they
are less overtly harmful to their wielder. Thus, the debate should
focus less on the brutality of methods and more on the fundamental
nature of coercion.
Accordingly, we propose a biologically accurate distinction
between permissible and impermissible coercion that rests on two fac-
tors: the source of pressure and the mode of inhibiting the subject's
self-control. Any technique which relies on dehumanizing sources of
pressure (e.g., forcing a mother to watch her child being tortured) or
modes of overcoming resistance (e.g., starvation) must be avoided.
This approach permits policymakers to weigh potential techniques
without being misled by a novel mechanism for overriding the sub-
ject's will, such as direct neurological stimulation or new and potent
pharmaceuticals. At the same time, this approach provides clearer
support for the distinction between forbidden methods and permissi-
ble techniques like the "Christian burial speech" or exploiting one's
love of family, which rely on pressures that do not debase the subject
147. See, e.g., Osama bin Laden, Message to the American People, in AL-QAEDA IN ITS
OwN WORDS, supra note 84, at 71, 73.
148. See sources cited supra note 123.
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or the interrogator and are therefore compatible with waging a just
war.
Waging a just war requires careful adherence to standards that
avoid dehumanizing our enemies or ourselves. And while we join
Admiral Stockdale in rejecting the view held by Seidman that torture
uncovers an abyss beneath human society or exposes the rootlessness
of human life, Seidman's conclusion is understandable given the
unimaginable trauma of suffering torture. Thus, the implications of
Professor Seidman's conclusions for interrogators, prisoners, the
armed forces, and the people of the United States must be considered
in the calculus of obtaining actionable intelligence while holding the
moral high ground.
Ultimately, then, we suggest that maintaining our awareness of
the distinction between ourselves and the enemies we fight is the key
to holding the moral high ground. Many justifications for torture and
coercive interrogation are inadequate because they fail to address this
problem. Regardless of a detainee's status, the duration of the harm a
particular technique inflicts, or the value of the information gathered
through coercive interrogations, such policies erode our warfighters'
awareness that our cause is just and worth fighting for. In addition to
diminishing the armed forces' effectiveness, torture erodes the public
support necessary to win a long engagement by betraying our beliefs,
tarnishing our self-image, and falsifying our promises to host coun-
tries and the rest of the world. Whatever tactical and logistical flexibil-
ity will be necessary to fight jihadist extremism in this age of
asymmetric warfare, the worst defeat may well be to use our enemies'
weapons against them at the cost of undermining the principles that
we hope to inculcate in their culture and to preserve in ours.
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